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Abstract
A new treatment to determine the Pareto-optimal outcome for a non-zero-sum game is presented. An equilibrium point for
any game is defined here as a set of strategy choices for the players, such that no change in the choice of any single player
will increase the overall payoff of all the players. Determining equilibrium for multi-player games is a complex problem. An
intuitive conceptual tool for reducing the complexity, via the idea of spatially representing strategy options in the
bargaining problem is proposed. Based on this geometry, an equilibrium condition is established such that the product of
their gains over what each receives is maximal. The geometrical analysis of a cooperative bargaining game provides an
example for solving multi-player and non-zero-sum games efficiently.
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Introduction
1.1 Scope and Objective
Pareto-optimality is concerned with the logical analysis of
optimizing a set of strategies in a real life situation involving the
interaction of more than one individual, that can be mathemat-
ically modeled as a game [1],[2]. The payoff in a game can be
non-measurable psychological parameters such as utility, prestige,
desire, security level, or measurable quantities that serve as a
common medium of exchange. Some simple games, such as the
bargaining problem [3], are known as non-zero-sum games and
the players try to achieve a win-win situation. The game ‘‘paper-
rock-scissors’’ is a zero-sum game, since the payoff to the winner of
a single instance of the game is equal to the loss of the other player.
In any game, there exist choices of strategies that may be adopted
to maximize sum total payoff. For a generic n-player game, there is
always a solution for the optimal strategy for each person. This
strategy guarantees their average payoff or loss is maximized or
minimized under the assumption that the opposing player also
uses an optimal strategy. This solution corresponds to the
equilibrium point (EP) of the game, and may be non-deterministic,
in that the optimal choice of strategy to use in any given play of the
game is chosen randomly according to a probability distribution
over all possible strategy choices.
In this paper, the focus is on the analysis of non-zero-sum games.
Another classic non-zero-sum game is ‘‘the Prisoner’s Dilemma’’
[4],[5],[6] but it pertains to a non-cooperative one. More practical
games typically involve multiple players in areas of economics [7]
and mathematical biology [8],[9],[10]. The computation of EP
increases significantly in complexity for multi-player, multi-strategy
and non-zero-sum cooperative games [11].
The notion of an EP is the key ingredient in a game, and is what
we aim to obtain. There may be more than one EP; and for a two-
person zero-sum game, it is simply the set of all pairs of opposing
good strategies [12] whereas for a non-zero-sum game, it consists
of pairs of reinforcing good strategies. The approach to solving
non-zero-sum cooperative games, for the case of two players, can
be better understood if the utility gains of all possible actions are
computed and plotted as a set of alternatives on a two-dimensional
graph. The convex point at the vertex of the possible set of
solutions corresponds to the optimal utility gain for both persons.
For an n-players game, this treatment can be extrapolated to a set
of alternatives on a multi-dimensional graph.
1.2 Theory of Utility
The theory of utility can be observed in many games. In the
simplest bargaining scenario presented by Nash, two cooperative
individuals have a certain list of goods to barter trade [12]. This
simple example can be extended to other situations of bargaining,
such as employer and union negotiation, or to that of two villages
with different resources and an aim of optimizing economic benefit
in trade. As an example, we present a primitive scenario whereby
two villages, hereby labeled as Villages 1 and 2, are involved in
barter trading of specific goods. Village 1 relies on coal production
as the main source of its revenue. Village 2 is assumed to have
abundant cattle production but has insufficient coal resources. We
make a further assumption that cattle are of lesser abundance, and
hence these goods enjoy a higher value compared to coal. If the
two villages concentrate on their strengths of production
individually, and perform trading of the goods that have different
utilities to each party, a point of equilibrium in trade will be
reached at a certain point of time. Coal will naturally be more
valued within Village 2 due to limitation, but a huge quantity of
cattle will essentially not be produced if greater efforts are aimed at
producing coal. It is better to trade cattle for coal since this is a less
expensive alternative in terms of value that pertains to the good.
Village 1 that trades coal for cattle perceives and thinks likewise. A
certain equilibrium trading quantity of the two goods can be
reached in a mutual trade agreement depending on the utility value
of goods to each village. This equilibrium corresponds to the
payoff of the two villages.
From a psychological perspective, the utility value of an item to
an individual is dictated by state of mind at a particular time. It
varies according to the events that occurred to the person
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Analogously, the security level of performing a specific task can
also be linked to this utility value. In practice, we are all dictated by
this value in determining our actions or performing any type of
task assigned to us. For instance, a shopper may decide to buy a tin
of cookies instead of a box of chocolates because the cookies
appeal more to that person in terms of taste, price or aesthetic
property, and hence, has a higher utility value in comparison. This
utility value may change when the shopper tires of eating cookies
after a few days and desires a taste of chocolate the next time.
Desire or utility of a grocery to a shopper may also vary based on
available quantity at its time of acquisition.
It is difficult to construct a perfect model of a game that is a
reflection of reality. There will always be numerous outcomes to
consider even for the simplest games. For example, when volumes
of items are divided for exchange, its value to each player may
change. There are usually too many variables such as the
bargaining abilities of the players, the norms of the society, and
the variation in utility of the items over time for the formal theory
to be accommodated [14]. But understanding bargaining games
from a simplistic perspective can assist in the study and
formulation of frameworks for determining EP.
1.3 The Bargaining Problem
For the bargaining problem, we illustrate how, as a special case,
the two persons can perform barter trade such that their utility
gains are maximized. We assume two players - Player 1 and Player
2 who are in a position to barter goods but have no money to
facilitate the exchange [12]. Bargaining theory is a generalized
concept of the two-person bargaining problem. The game is a
cooperative one as both players have complete information about
the game; each player is fully aware of the payoff or profit for
themselves and their co-players, for every possible transaction.
Such games are also known as cooperative games in which all players
have identical interests.
In the two-player bargaining situation, a compact convex
metrical space Si of mixed strategies si pertains to Player i, for
i [ f1,2g. These mixed strategies represent the courses of action
the player can take independently of the other players. The
randomization process of establishing all possible strategy
alternatives illustrates the possible joint courses of action by the
players. This set of alternatives can be represented by a convex
polytope in the plane with the dimensions of utility gains for the
players. For each pair of mixed strategies (s1, s2) from (S1, S2), the
payoffs for the deployment of these strategies are denoted by
P1(s1, s2) and P2(s1, s2) respectively. Such payoff of each mixed
strategy pair corresponds to a point in the convex polytope of the
super set strategy alternatives [13].
An outcome is in equilibrium if there is no other possible
agreement that allows both players to have higher payoffs
simultaneously [14]. The barter trade such that maximum utility
gain Gi is achieved is known as Pareto-optimal. Note that gain is
the excess of payoff after bargaining over the initial payoff before
strategy choices are chosen. Nash has shown that obtaining the
maximum of the product of the two utility gains (G1 and G2) from
the set of alternatives, known as the Nash product G1G2, will attain
the Pareto-optimal solution for the bargaining situation. Pareto-
optimality is a non-zero sum Nash game equilibrium point that
determines the Pareto efficiency of the outcome. It is also
worthwhile mentioning that there may be more than one
equilibrium point, and this set of points can be defined as the
equilibrium point (EP).
The combinatorial plot for this bargaining situation is illustrated
in Figure 1, where the set of alternatives for all possible item
exchanges is enclosed by a boundary curve. We make the
assumption that at least one item is possessed by each player in the
end. The super set of alternatives results in a convex polygon
whereby the product of maximum utility gains is maximized at its
vertex. In practice, we aim to optimize the Nash product G1G2.
The solution is a Pareto-optimal outcome, in which the joint
profits by all parties are maximized. It may be worthwhile noting
that the Nash equilibrium is not unique as multiple or even an
infinite number of strategies that pertain to the Nash equilibria
exist. In this game theoretical setup, all items are discrete, and the
discreteness of the payoffs increases the complexity of attaining the
solution.
1.4 Pareto-optimal Equilibrium
Based on a multi-player bargaining situation, establishing the
payoff matrix containing the super set of strategy choice
alternatives is computationally expensive. It is to be noted that
proving the existence of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium point and
finding the solution set at the equilibrium are different tasks. In
general, computation of a Pareto-optimal equilibrium point in
mixed strategies of a finite game poses a numerical challenge for
the following reason. For multiple players, determining the
Pareto-optimal equilibrium in mixed strategies amounts to
solving a system of multivariate polynomial equations of high
order [13] and, as a rule, does not have an explicit solution.
Despite significant progress in recent years, algorithms for
computing equilibrium are still not competent at solving very
large games. Approximate solution methods are often the best
computed solution or EP set. This forms the problem definition in
our study.
The concept of representing utility of strategy executions
geometrically is used to answer the fundamental question in the
Pareto-optimal equilibrium solution. Obtaining information re-
garding the strategy options and payoffs to every player, and with
respect to other players, is crucial to the computation of the
Pareto-optimal EP. This information can be represented spatially
in a geometrical framework. It turns out that by using the spatial
game setup, the extraction of the subset of strategy alternatives
from the superset can be achieved and the convergence to the
Pareto-optimal solution using less computation can be obtained.
Such a concept forms the main basis of this paper, and we will
examine the game theoretical geometry in greater details with the
support of case studies.
Figure 1. Set of bargaining alternatives for two players
whereby the Nash equilibrium corresponds to optimal utility
gains.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.g001
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The game theoretical studies by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1980) is based on the representation of all outcomes of n-player
games as payoff vectors such that points exist in an n-dimensional
utility space [15]. This has been a standard representation of utility
space for n-person game models to date. In the spatial game model
that they have created, outcomes of the games have been assumed
to lie in some low-dimensional Euclidean space such that utilities to
the players are defined in terms of distance from their most
preferred, or ideal points [16]. Such a representation is useful for
establishingoutcomesthatcorrespondtopublicgood (allindividuals
obtaining benefit from the same outcome). The model assumed that
utility is a decreasing function of the distance between the achieved
outcome and the ideal point [17].
For example, their m-dimensional spatial game is described as a
collection of n points Pi, i=1,…,n,i nm-dimensional Euclidean space
R
m.P o i n tPi is player i’s ideal point. The convex hull of the points
Pi[f1,...,ng isthe Pareto-optimal set. The points ofspace R
maretheitems
in the game that we have discussed. The players are to choose among
all the items in the game what they wish to own. It is assumed that a
player may be most satisfied with an item at Pi,h o w e v e rf a i l i n gt o
obtain that, the next possible closest item will be chosen.
The next section will focus on presenting a more refined
technique for determining the Pareto-optimality of a bargain-
ing problem for multi-players (n.2). The fundamental
concepts of representing utility as a distance in space will be
presented.
Methods
2.1 Geometrical Representation of Utility
Suppose the payoff value to the player of a strategy item being
executed can be represented by the ‘‘item-to-player’’ distance, such
that items of higher utility value have a higher spatial proximity. In
effect, the proximity value would be the inverse of the payoff value.
For two parties, if one represents all the items based on payoff value
on a two-dimensional space, an equilibrium line could be drawn to
assign that item to the respective player such that payoff value for
both ismaximized.Thistechnique removestheneed togenerate the
payoff gain for every single possible set of strategy execution, hence
avoiding intense computational load. In fact, this method of
assigning items of significance closer to the owner will effectively
eliminate the consideration of all the strategy alternatives, based on
the fact that the product of gain will be maximal at the location near
Figure 2. Geometrical distribution of items whose cross-links represent their distances to every person in an n-player game.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.g002
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strategy to assign items of low payoff to any one player. Now, this
distance-based approach is explored to derive the EP of a
bargaining situation.
The convex polytope of a multi-player game can be simplified
to a three dimensional spatial representation with the player-to-
player distances defined to be constant as shown in Figure 2. In
this approach, all items are represented as geometrical points
that lie within a boundary or space enclosed by the players
(labeled as 1, 2,…, n) that are presented as vertices of this spatial
volume. For example, based on three players, the items will lie
within an enclosed triangle. With four players, the items are
enclosed by a tetrahedron with four vertices. Based on a five-
player game, the positioning of items is within a space enclosed
by a pyramid. In general, n number of players will result in an n-
polyhedron defined by the ideal position of all players
representing its vertices. The distance between player-to-player
decreases as more players participate because for an item x,i t s
normalized and relative distances to all the players (labeled as
d1,x, d2,x,…, dn,x) add up to a unitary value. Therefore, the space
enclosed by the polyhedron becomes smaller as the number of
players increases.
2.1.1 Geometrical Distance of Item. We introduce the
following notation:
ui,x represents the utility of item x to player i;
di,x represents the normalized distance of item x to player i
with respect to other players;
The distance of an item to the player is defined as a decreasing
function of the utility. The inverse proportionality function is used.
Here, the distance of item x to player i is defined to be the inverse
of ui,x. Next, based on every item, its normalized distance is given by
the ratio of distance for player i to the sum of distances for all
players. The following equation presents the geometrical param-
eter as
Vx [ f1,:::,kg, Vi [ f1,:::,ng, di,x~
1
ui,x
P n
j~1
1
uj,x
   : ð1Þ
2.1.2 Prioritized Assignment of Items. The items are
arranged spatially based on their normalized distances to every
player in ascending order. Here, a list of items ordered in terms of
priority for player i is denoted as Pi where
Vi [ f1,:::, ng, Pi~ x : di,xvdi,y , V x,y ðÞ [ 1,:::, k fg , x=y
  
:ð2Þ
The normalized distance contains information regarding the priority of
the item to one player with respect to the others based on the
geometrical treatment presented in Section 3.1.1. The priority of an
item is an indication of its value or importance to the player, and is
the inverse of this normalized distance. Therefore, assigned items in
terms of priority is defined here as a possession list of items in
descending order of importance to a player.
Combinatorial analysis for all alternatives is computationally
expensive. Assigning items of lower priorities to a player shifts
the equilibrium away from the Pareto-optimality. On the
contrary, assignment of items with higher priorities converge the
solution set towards an EP. Assignment of items to a player by
traversing them from the highest priority to the lowest one
enhances computational resources. Therefore, instead of using
a combinatorial technique to obtain the optimal product of
gain for all players, a more efficient assignment approach
based on priority of items can be applied. Items can be spatially
arranged in terms of value for every player in the game. An
item priority to a player is based on the normalized distance with
respect to all players.
In summary, the method of assigning items focuses on
considering a set of alternatives that lies close to the real solution
set. In a way, it eliminates the redundant computation of
Figure 3. Spatial positions of items presented in x-direction and magnitudes of their utilities and utility-distance products in y-
direction for two players.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.g003
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demonstrate that the EP solution set lies within the reduced set
of alternatives.
2.2 Basis of Convergence towards Equilibrium
It is computationally expensive to consider all bargaining
alternatives from a combinatorial set. This section describes a
technique for evaluating a bargaining game via item assignment to
each player. It analyzes the game based on multiple cases of item
assignment by taking into account one player that pertains to each
case. For n players, such assignment of items is performed n times.
The utility is related to priority. Since priority is the inverse of
normalized distance of a bargain item, a property that relates to the
payoff per priority is introduced here. To achieve this, we will
discuss this indicator from a mechanical perspective. For a
mechanical lever system, the moment w by weight ~ w w about a
point Q is defined as the product w=|~ w w|d, where d is the
(perpendicular) distance between Q and the line of action L of ~ w w.I f
~ r r is the vector from Q to any point A on L, then the moment
vector of ~ p p about Q is given by ~ w=~ r r6~ w w.
Assume two players (i [ {1,2}) possessing items given by
x [ {1,…,11} such that utility ui is a function of importance of
an item to a player and represented by its normalized distance di as
shown in Figure 3. Here, ui is assumed to be a decreasing function
of di.Autility-distance product of an item value (which is related to its
importance in terms of payoff to the player) is based on distance d
from a player spatially and in vector form. We denote this entity
as w
?
i, which is a function of ui and di. For n players, using each
player as a pivot point, the importance of an item can be weighing
about n number of pivots such that their utility-distance product
vectors have the same magnitude.
From a mechanical perspective, equally spaced weights on a
lever are aligned along the same direction such that the weights
on the left hand side generate a collective moment that opposes
the moment caused by the weights on the right. By the same
concept, to maintain zero utility-distance product equilibrium, the
sum of utility-distance product vectors by all the items is equally
divided for the players (Figure 4). Selecting items of closer
distance to the player maximizes their payoffs. Maximizing the
sum of utility-distance products for every player simultaneously
provides the equilibrium solution for such theoretical game using
this geometrical setup.
Assume that the items are analogous to equal quantity of
weights on a lever system that is balanced such that
X k
x~1
w1,x~
X k
x~1
w2,x~:::~
X k
x~1
wn,x: ð3Þ
Consider that the utility-distance product vector of an item x about
ap l a y e ri from spatial vector ~ r ri,x is denoted by ~ w wi,x.Ap l a y e r
has k items, each of value ~ w wi,x. For an ideal condition whereby
Figure 4. Determination of equilibrium based on distribution of utility-distance product vectors about a pivot point for two players.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.g004
Table 1. Utility of goods for Villages (i {1, 2}).
Village x Goods u1,x u2,x
1 1 Coal 2 4
2 Cattle 2 2
3 Mineral 2 1
4O i l 2 2
5 Salt 4 1
2 6 Iron 10 1
7 Steel 4 1
8 Wine 6 2
9G a s 2 2
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.t001
Table 2. Utility-distance product of goods for Villages (i [ {1, 2}).
x Goods d1,x w1,x d2,x w2,x
1 Coal 0.667 1.334 0.333 1.334
2 Cattle 0.500 1.000 0.500 1.000
3 Mineral 0.333 0.667 0.667 0.667
4 Oil 0.500 1.000 0.500 1.000
5 Salt 0.200 0.800 0.800 0.800
6 Iron 0.0909 0.909 0.909 0.909
7 Steel 0.200 0.800 0.800 0.800
8 Wine 0.250 1.500 0.750 1.500
9 Gas 0.500 1.000 0.500 1.000
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.t002
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players, and at equal distances. Here, the vector sum of utility-
distance products is
~ W W~
X k
x~1
~ r r1,x|~ w w1,xz
X k
x~1
~ r r2,x|~ w w2,xz:::z
X k
x~1
~ r rn,x|~ w wn,x: ð4Þ
Due to our assumption that utility decreases linearly with respect to
distance, a pivot positioned at a distance of
1
n
X k
x~1
~ r ri,x causes the
vectors given by ~ w wi,x =~ r ri,x|~ w wi,x to sum up to zero where
~ W W~
X k
x~1
~ w w1,xz
X k
x~1
~ w w2,xz:::z
X k
x~1
~ w wn,x~0: ð5Þ
In practice, the vector ~ r ri,x may vary for different items. A more
appropriate determination of pivot location can be based on
balancing utility-distance products vectors with respect to n player,
which is given by
Vi [ f1,:::,ng, mi~
1
n
X k
x~1
wi,x: ð6Þ
In theory, utility-distance product of an item is analogous to moment of
force by weights based on a leversystem.Bysuitably locating a pivot
location such that distribution of the utility-distance product vectors are
uniformly positioned about a pivot, equilibrium can be achieved.
This concept can effectively reduce computational load of item
assignments in a multi-player game theoretical situation. The
reducedsetofalternativesthatisdeterminedisthesolutionsetcloser
to Pareto-optimality, which forms the basis of convergence towards
EP.
2.2.1 Utility-Distance Product of Item. From Section
3.1.1, the properties utilized in our framework are ui,x, which
represents the utility of item x to player i; And di,x represents the
normalized distance of item x to player i with respect to other players.
We also define the utility-distance product wi,x of the item x from
distance di,x for the player i.
The utility-distance product for an item denoted as x, is computed
by multiplying the normalized distance of that item with its
corresponding payoff value for player i such that
Vx [ f1,:::,kg, Vi [ f1,:::,ng, wi,x~
1
P n
j~1
1
uj,x
   : ð7Þ
2.2.2 Pareto-Optimality Based on Geometry. For k items,
every itemx isprioritized based on normalized distancesdi,xfrom player
itoformalistgivenbyPi(Equation(2)).Here,Pi,xrepresentsanitem
x in the order of priority for a player. Cumulative values of utility-
distance products are determined based on the list Wi, which consists of
k items in descending order of priority. Here, Wi,x corresponds to an
item at position x in this list. The possession list of every player is
initialized to null. We define si as the items after bargaining in one
strategy set for the player i respectively. The items are traversed in
the high to low priority direction, and assigned to player i’s possession
list untilthecumulativeutility-distanceproductsequalsmi.Recall thatmi
is the quantification of utility-distance products up to a point of
equilibrium (Equation (6)). The item that corresponds to the pivot
location is hereby denoted as ai. We note that ai may not lie exactly
at the pivoting point. Mathematically,
Vi [ f1,:::,ng,
Wi~ wi,xD x : Pi,x, Vx [ f1,:::,kg
  
, ð8Þ
si~ Pi,xDx :
X x
l~1
Wi,lƒmi, Vx [ f1,:::,kg
()
, ð9Þ
ai~ Pi,xDx : miƒ
X x
l~1
Wi,lvmizWi,xz1, Vx [ f1,:::,kg
()
: ð10Þ
Table 3. Cumulative utility-distance products of goods for Villages (i [ {1, 2}).
Goods assigned to Village 1 Goods assigned to Village 2
Iron Salt Steel Wine Mineral Cattle Oil Gas Coal
x=6 x=5 x=7 x=8 x=3 x=2 x=4 x=9 x=1
a1=w1,6 a2=a1+w1,5 a3=a2+w1,7 a4=a3+w1,8 a5=a4+w1,3 a6=a5+w1,2 a7=a6+w1,4 a8=a7+w1,9 a9=a8+w1,1
0.909 1.709 2.509 4.009 4.676 5.676 6.676 7.676 9.009
b9=b8+w2,6 b8=b7+w2,5 b7=b6+w2,7 b6=b5+w2,8 b5=b4+w2,3 b4=b3+w2,2 b3=b2+w2,4 b2=b1+w2,9 b1=w2,1
9.008 8.099 7.299 6.499 4.999 4.332 3.332 2.332 1.332
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.t003
Table 4. Utility of goods for Villages (i [ {1, 2}).
Village x Goods u1,x u2,x
1 1 Coal 2 4
2 Cattle 2 2
3 Mineral 2 1
4O i l 2 2
5 Salt 4 1
6 Iron 10 1
7 Steel 4 1
2 8 Wine 6 2
9G a s 2 2
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.t004
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EP can be made. If the items are assumed to be discrete, then
assignment of items up to ai for player i forms a strategy set si.
Repeating such an assignment for n players forms n strategy sets,
{s1, s2,… ,sn}, whereby this n-tuple of strategies forms the
negotiation set of the game. Pareto-optimal equilibrium is attained
when no player can increase their payoff any more by changing
strategy and assuming that none of the other players is going to
change their strategies.
Results
3.1 Definition of n-player Bargaining Case Studies
The multi-player bargaining scenario is a cooperative game;
information is shared and every member trades in such a manner
that their strategies will mutually benefit all the players in the
game. The existence of a transferable commodity is assumed to be
present. From the bargaining perspective, the items of transaction
are analogous to the strategy choices, and the utility gain of a
typical transaction is analogous to the payoff of executing a
particular strategy. The proposed case studies will only work for
relative payoff values for the players. In this paper, we denote the
payoff as a function of item x, whereby Pi (x [ f1,2,:::,kg) for
player i and k number of items. To limit the EP to only one
solution (assuming that no two or more items are similar), the
optimality condition is defined in this paper as a function of the
product of gains.
We have assumed that the items are being assigned based on
non-initialized possession lists. The utility gains are positive
provided that the initial total payoff value of any one list does
not exceed that of the created solution possession list. Assume that
the initial payoff for Player i is Pi9. Then for n players, the product
of payoff gain is given by
N~G1|...|Gn~(P1{P1
0)|...|(Pn{Pn
0): ð11Þ
For all players i such that Pi is greater than Pi9, positive payoff by
all persons is achieved. Negative gain situations can be prevented
by first assigning the items starting from those with higher priorities
in the ordered list based on normalized distances until their aggregate
payoff values equal or exceed the initial payoff value. The
remaining items are then assigned again starting from the one with
the next highest priority.
3.2 Two-player Bargaining Game (n=2)
A primitive setup of a two-village bargaining problem is
defined here, in which Villages 1 and 2 possess goods to perform
barter trade (Table 1), with the objective of maximizing the
gains.
The initial values of the utility sums for the villages are
P1
0(x [ 1,2,3,4,5 fg )~12; P2
0(x [ 6,7,8,9 fg )~6: ð12Þ
In Table 2, based on Equations (1) and (7), the normalized distances
and utility-distance product for Villages 1 and 2 (denoted as i=1 and 2
respectively) are presented.
The equilibrium condition is
Vi [ 1,2 fg , mi~
1
2
X 9
x~1
wi,x~4:500,
whereby mi is used to determine ai:
ð13Þ
The cumulative utility-distance products of the goods are listed in
Table 3 in terms of priority for Village 1 that is ordered from left to
right. For Village 2, the cumulative operation starts in the opposite
direction. The geometrical treatment gives ai as Mineral (x=3).
An EP set is determined here: all goods of higher priority to Village
1 up till before ai are assigned to this village and the rest of the
goods pertain to Village 2. Based on the possession lists of the two
players, we obtain
P1(x [ 6,5,7,8 fg )~24; P2(x [ 1,9,4,2,3 fg )~11;
G1(x [ 6,5,7,8 fg )~12; G2(x [ 1,9,4,2,3 fg )~5;
N~G1G2~60:
ð14Þ
The same scenario in a two-village game is considered but
discussions of special situations such as negative utility gains are
established using a different data set. An example using a data set
with a significantly different total utility values between the two
players can illustrate the problem.
Table 5. Cumulative utilities of goods for Villages (i [ {1,2}).
Goods assigned to Village 1 Goods assigned to Village 2
Iron Salt Steel Wine Mineral Cattle Oil Gas Coal
x=6 x=5 x=7 x=8 x=3 x=2 x=4 x=9 x=1
a1=u1,6 a2=a1+u1,5 a3=a2+u1,7 a4=a3+u1,8 a5=a4+u1,3 a6=a5+u1,2 a7=a6+u1,4 a8=a7+u1,9 a9=a8+u1,1
10 14 18 24 26 28 30 32 34
b9=b8+u2,6 b8=b7+u2,5 b7=b6+u2,7 b6=b5+u2,8 b5=b4+u2,3 b4=b3+u2,2 b3=b2+u2,4 b2=b1+u2,9 b1=u2,1
16 15 14 13 11 10 8 6 4
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.t005
Table 6. Cumulative utility-distance products of unassigned
goods.
Goods
Cattle Oil Gas
x=2 x=4 x=9
a1=w1,2 a2=a1+w1,4 a3=a2+w1,9
1.000 2.000 3.000
b3=b2+w2,2 b2=b1+w2,4 b1=w2,9
3.000 2.000 1.000
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.t006
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possession list with a difference in sum of utilities for initial goods of
possession. If one village has a final utility sum that is lower than the
initial total utility value, then the product of utility gain is negative. This
usually occurs when one village has a significantly larger possession list
in comparison with the other one. Let us consider the case of having a
larger difference in sum of utilities for initial goods. Assume that
Villages 1 and 2 have different goods as shown by Table 4.
The initial values of the utility sums for the villages are
P1
0(x [ 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 fg )~26; P2
0(x [ 8,9 fg )~4: ð15Þ
Bargaining, based on the assumption that villages have initial
possession lists, results in
P1(x [ 6,5,7,8 fg )~24; P2(x [ 1,9,4,2,3 fg )~11;
G1~{2; G2~7;
N~G1G2~{14:
ð16Þ
The proposed approach can present the utility gains with
optimality by assigning of goods a priori. Referring to the priority
ordering, and listing the cumulative utility values for Villages 1 and
2, some of the goods can be assigned a priori in Table 5 before
determination of ai using Table 6.
Here, a possession list that pertains to Village 1 comprises of Iron,
Salt, Steel, Wine, and Mineral, while that of Village 2 consists of
Coal only. The remaining goods are Cattle, Oil, and Gas. These
goods can be assigned by determining the utility-distance products for
Village 1 and 2 to give ai as Oil. The utilities and gains are
P1(x [ 6,5,7,8,3,2 fg )~28; P2(x [ 1,9,4 fg )~8;
G1~2; G2~4;
N~G1G2~8:
ð17Þ
In practice, we create an initial list of goods and then assign the
remaining ones. This can save computation of the utility-distance
products for the goods of bargain that can be initialized ap r i o r i .
3.3 Three-player Bargaining Game (n=3)
The geometrical framework for a bargaining game by two
players can be generalized to n players. In general, this method
facilitates an ordered priority list for every player when determining
the equilibrium point. This concept can be extended to the
calculation of bargaining solution for multiple villages involved in
the exchange of their produce limited by our assumptions. As only
one village needs to be considered at a time for good assignment,
we are able to determine the assignment of bargaining goods
towards attaining EP and maximization of gains.
Suppose that three villages (i [ {1,2,3}) is involved in a
bargaining game (n=3). The normalized distances and utility-
distance products of initially possessed goods are presented in
Table 7. The geometrical representation of the goods is
illustrated in Figure 5, which shows the utility values of the
goods for each village spatially on a two-dimensional plane.
Figure 6 shows the utility-distance product of each item to the
respective player. The goods are positioned at various loci of the
enclosed triangle. Here, the locus is based on the distances from
item to each player vertex.
Table 7. Utility-distance product of goods for Villages (i [ {1,2,3}).
Village x Goods u1,x d1,x w1,x u2,x d2,x w2,x u3,x d3,x w3,x
1 1 Coal 2 0.286 0.572 4 0.143 0.572 1 0.572 0.572
2 Cattle 2 0.333 0.666 2 0.333 0.666 2 0.333 0.666
3 Mineral 2 0.250 0.5 1 0.500 0.500 2 0.250 0.500
4 Oil 2 0.429 0.858 2 0.429 0.858 3 0.143 0.858
5 Salt 4 0.111 0.444 1 0.444 0.444 1 0.444 0.444
2 6 Iron 10 0.0476 0.476 1 0.476 0.476 1 0.476 0.476
7 Steel 4 0.143 0.572 1 0.572 0.572 2 0.286 0.572
8 Wine 6 0.167 1.002 2 0.500 1.000 3 0.333 0.999
9 Gas 2 0.400 0.8 2 0.400 0.800 4 0.200 0.800
3 10 Orange 1 0.545 0.545 2 0.273 0.546 3 0.182 0.546
11 Timber 3 0.182 0.546 2 0.273 0.546 1 0.545 0.545
12 Milk 1 0.333 0.333 1 0.333 0.333 1 0.333 0.333
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.t007
3
1 2
Cattle
Mineral
Coal
Oil
Salt
Milk
Steel
Gas
Orange
Timber
Iron Wine
Figure 5. Geometrical distribution of goods for Villages
(i [ [ {1,2,3}).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.g005
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P1
0(x[ 1,2,3,4,5 fg )~12; P2
0(x[ 6,7,8,9 fg )~6; P3
0(x[ 10,11,12 fg )~5: ð18Þ
An equilibrium condition can be determined by
Vi [ 1,2,3 fg , mi~
1
3
X 12
x~1
wi,x~2:438,
whereby mi is used to determine ai:
ð19Þ
From Table 8, we deduced that a1 =Wine, a2 =Milk, and
a3 =Steel. Here, goods assigned to Villages 1, 2, and 3 are {Iron,
Salt, Steel, and Wine}, {Coal, Orange, Timber, Cattle, and Milk},
and {Oil, Orange, Gas, Mineral, and Steel} respectively. The
Orange entity is assigned simultaneously to Village 2 and Village
3’s possession lists. And Steel appears in Village 1 and Village 3’s
possessions. Since Steel has a higher priority to Village 1 than
Village 3, and the same condition occurs for the case of Village 2
versus Village 3, during the assignment of Orange, Village 1 and
Village 3 are assigned Steel and Orange respectively.
The result of assignment is displayed in Table 9. Here, we obtain
P1(x [ 6,5,7,8 fg )~24; P2(x [ 1,11,2,12 fg )~9; P3(x [ 4,10,9,2 fg )~12;
G1~12; G2~3; G3~7;
N~G1G2G3~252:
ð20Þ
Figure 6. Geometrical distribution of goods presented with magnitudes of utility and utility-distance product for Villages (i [ [ {1,2,3}).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010331.g006
ð18Þ
ð20Þ
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set for multiple players (n=3) demonstrates that equilibrium can be
attained by balancing the utility-distance product values of all goods
among the three villages. Payoff in terms of utility is arbitrarily set to
present a barter trade scenario here as a case study. In practice, the
game is based on an arbitrary number of players in order to
demonstrate the fundamental principles of the technique without
incurring furthercomplexities that mayariseif more playersare used.
Discussion
The solution to a bargaining problem is reflected as the Pareto-
optimal EP of the set of bargaining alternatives. The combination
of possible sets escalates when the number of strategy choices and
players increases. To reduce the number of alternatives considered
in a combinatorial set, the concept of using spatial distance to
represent the significance of the item to the player in a non-zero-
sum game can be implemented.
To allow assignment of items while considering only one player
at a time, the concept of using the geometrical distance to
represent utility of items is introduced. Then, this technique can
extract a smaller set of alternatives from the super set of strategy
alternatives and enables the Pareto-optimal EP to be obtained
from this reduced set. The attainment of the solution is determined
by the nature of the strategy choices. Instead of using multivariate
polynomial functions, the geometrical approach reduces the
computational expenses involved in determining EP. For instance,
the concept of shifting the bargaining outcome towards Pareto-
optimal equilibrium is by geometrically positioning items of higher
priority to one player with respect to the others using a shorter
relative distance.
Spatial representation of items based on their utility can be used
to derive the Pareto-optimal EP in non-zero-sum games. This
method relies on the concept of spatial distribution of items
respective to its level of significance to the players involved. The
efficiency of calculating the EP for n- players in a game has been
greatly improved, but there are a few limitations that have yet to
be resolved such as the definition of an optimality equation in the
bargaining game. This is a very important tool as the EP of a
large-scale game is the main objective of almost all the real games
in the world.
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